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Abstract: 
Recent corporate scandals around the world have led many to single out executive stock 
options as one of the main culprits. More corporations are abandoning stock options and 
reverting to restricted stock. This paper argues that such a change is not entirely 
justifiable. We first provide a critical review of the pros and cons of executive stock 
options. We then compare option-based contracts with stock-based contracts using a 
simple principal-agent model with moral-hazard. In a general environment without 
restrictions on preferences or technologies, option-based contracts are shown to weakly 
dominate stock-based contracts. The weak dominance relation becomes strict if the 
manager is risk neutral. Numerical examples are provided to show that, even if the 
manager is risk averse, strict dominance is more likely the case. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the wake of high-profile accounting frauds and governance failures that recently 
plagued corporations around the world, much of the blame has been directed to executive 
compensation in general, and stock options in particular. Remedial actions and 
recommendations have been made by corporations, investors and regulators alike. 
Regulators have been pushing to mandate expensing of stock options against accounting 
earnings. For example, the International Accounting Standards Board announced in 
February 2003 that firms using international accounting standards must expense stock 
options beginning January 1, 2005. The US Financial Accounting Standards Board is of a 
similar view, although a suitable valuation model has yet to be worked out. Institutional 
investors are also urging expensing of stock options. TIAA-CREF has announced a 
campaign to lobby 1,750 major public corporations in which it owns shares to begin 
expensing options. Institutional Shareholder Services and the Council of Institutional 
Investors in the US have also called for the use of indexed options although this would 
reduce reported earnings according to the current US accounting rule (Business Week, 
February 28, 2000). 
Steps taken by corporations have been diverse. Dozens of large US corporations 
have committed to expensing options. They include Amazon.com, Bank One, Citigroup, 
Coca-Cola and Hewlett-Packard while many high technology companies including Intel, 
Cisco and Siebel are against expensing stock options (Forbes, July 24, 2002; The New 
York Times, March 17, 2004).On the other hand, not a few corporations are taking the 
antipodean approach of abandoning stock options altogether. In July 2003, Microsoft 
announced that it would stop issuing stock options but instead award restricted stock to 
its 50,000 employees. Following the announcement, The Wall Street Journal (July 9, 
2003) declared, “The golden age of stock options is over.” General Electric would also 
replace stock options for its CEO with share units subject to performance hurdles (The 
Wall Street Journal, September 18, 2003).4 
At least in the US, there is indeed a visible trend indicating that the mix of long-
term incentives for CEOs is changing. The Wall Street Journal-Mercer Human Resource 
Consulting 2004 CEO Compensation Survey (Mercer Human Resource Consulting, 2005) 
reports that the most striking of the changing trend in CEO compensation is the 
movement away from stock options and toward other long-term vehicles. Out of 350 
large US companies surveyed, a total of 273 companies awarded stock options to CEOs 
in 2004, compared to 278 in 2003 and 295 in 2002, a gradual decline of 7.5 percent over 
the two year period. But 166 CEOs received restricted stock grants in 2004, compared to 
138 in 2003 and 104 in 2002, a 59.6 percent jump over the same period. In value terms, 
stock options represented 76 percent of long-term incentives in 2002, declined to 62 
                                                 
4 Other firms are changing the terms of stock option grant. For example, IBM is scrapping at-the-money 
options and granting premium options to its senior executives, following a path taken by German 
companies such as SAP and Siemens (The New York Times, February 25, 2004). Other high-tech 
companies continue to rely on stock options, however. Recently Apple, Adobe, and EDS have adjusted 
downwards the exercise prices of employee stock options that are out of the money (The Asian Wall Street 
Journal, August 13, 2003). 
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percent in 2003, and to 57 percent in 2004. During the same period, the value of 
restricted stock increased from 12 percent to 20 percent, and then to 23 percent.5 
Scrapping of executive stock options is not limited to the US. Several large 
Australian companies such as Commonwealth Bank, Telstra and WMC announced they 
would also abandon stock options. By and large, they are replacing stock options with 
shares subject to performance hurdles. In an interview with the Australian Broadcasting 
Company on August 22, 2002, David Murray, CEO and managing director of 
Commonwealth Bank, said, “We felt that we can achieve in our long-term incentive plans 
all that we need to without options and with shares, still with performance hurdles and at 
far less dilution to the shareholder and without that sort of extra prize to the executive 
that if you happen to be around in the right circumstances in a boom. (...) So we felt it 
was better to get rid of them.” 
It is conceivable that these changes have been prompted by a host of factors. 
Changes in accounting rules, the introduction of tighter corporate governance codes such 
as Sarbanes-Oxley in the US, the pressure from institutional investors and shareholder 
groups such as the California Pension Retirement System (CalPERS), and, perhaps to an 
extent, corporations’ bid to look legitimate to public eyes may all account for the changes. 
How or whether these factors have led to the current trend is an important question that 
needs to be studied further as more data become available. However it is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
Should executive stock options be abandoned? Do alternative stock-based 
incentive schemes serve the purpose of incentive compensation better than stock options? 
This paper attempts to provide answers to these questions. In doing so, we make a 
number of simplifying assumptions. First, the answers would depend on a variety of 
factors such as internal governance mechanisms, regulation pertinent to compensation, 
and the workings of stock markets. We assume, therefore, that all these factors remain the 
same when we compare alternative contractual forms. Nonetheless, criticisms against 
executive stock options are almost always related to these factors. We thus offer some 
discussions on these factors in Section 2. Second, we will not be explicit about various 
performance hurdles such as total shareholders return, which often come with option 
grant. While such performance hurdles have been common in Australia for some time, 
they are relatively new in the US, presumably due to unfavourable accounting treatment 
of such instruments. Third, our approach, as most other approaches in economics and 
finance, will be agency-theoretic. Should other theories of corporate governance be more 
pertinent, the answers to our questions could be different.6  In sum, our focus is on 
comparing contracts based on stock options with their main replacement, those based on 
restricted stock, within the same, simple environment in which there are intrinsic 
conflicts of interests between shareholders and self-interested managers. 
                                                 
5 It is often argued that smaller start-ups may be disadvantaged by this trend because they often face cash 
constraints and options can provide more incentives in the presence of growth opportunities. While such an 
argument is not limited to executive stock options, empirical evidence on the relationship between option 
grants and cash constraints is mixed. See, for example, Oyer and Schaefer (2005).  
6 Alternative theories, proposed most notably in the area of organizational behavior, include managerial 
hegemony theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, resource dependence theory, and institutional 
theory. 
 
 4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the 
criticisms against executive stock options and review the relevant literature. Section 3 
provides dominance results. In a most general environment without restrictions on 
preferences or technologies, option-based contracts are shown to weakly dominate stock-
based contracts. With a risk-neutral manager protected by limited liability, the dominance 
relation becomes strict. In Section 4, we offer numerical examples and show that strict 
dominance is more likely the case even if the manager is risk averse. Section 5 concludes 
the paper. 
 
 
2. Executive Stock Options: Critique and the Literature Review 
 
The main criticisms against executive stock options can be summed up as: (i) the 
difficulty of accounting issues in general, and of expensing options in particular;7 (ii) the 
opportunity cost of options for the granting firm higher than the value of options to 
undiversified executives; (iii) giving extra incentives to executives to manipulate 
accounting information; (iv) rewarding executives excessively in the boom market; (v) 
failure to penalize bad performance by resetting option price in the down market; and, 
related to the above two, (vi) encouraging executives to take excessive risks at the cost of 
the shareholders. 
The issue of expensing options is still hotly debated among academics and 
practitioners alike, and it does not seem that we could reach a clear answer. Suffice it to 
summarize the main arguments for and against. There are three main arguments in favour 
of expensing options. First, the information regarding option compensation as currently 
contained in the footnotes of company reports is not sufficient to tell investors the actual 
costs to the firm. In support of this, the US Federal Reserve Board estimates that the 
failure to expense options has led to the overstatement of corporate profits by at least 2.5 
percent a year over the five-year period to 2002 (The Economist, 2002). Second and 
related, expensing options will provide a level playing field so that both the firms using 
cash bonuses and the firms using stock options will have an expense on the income 
statement. Third, it will improve corporate governance by reducing or eliminating 
incentives to manipulate accounting information. 
Those against expensing options argue that the playing field is already level since 
the market will deduce the actual value of the stock diluted by additional shares promised 
by stock option awards. Moreover a lack of consensus as to how to value executive stock 
options for expensing purpose could lead to an even more distorted picture of a firm’s 
economic condition than financial statements currently paint (Sahlman, 2002). Second, 
expensing options will unfairly disadvantage start-ups and high-tech companies with 
growth opportunities as they typically lack cash to motivate and retain high quality 
employees. Third, manipulation of accounting information is a broader governance issue, 
rather than the problem of compensation practice per se. 
Some argue that options are an expensive way to motivate executives (Hall and 
Murphy, 2000, 2002; Meulbroek, 2001). The opportunity cost of an option to the granting 
                                                 
7 At least in the US, an additional criticism is as to why different options are treated differently for 
accounting and tax purposes (Hall and Murphy, 2003). 
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firm is the option premium the firm can receive by selling the option in the market. 
However the value of an option to executives is smaller than its market value since their 
wealth and human capital are undiversified, and many restrictions attached to executive 
stock options do not render the same risk-neutral valuation of an option applicable for the 
receiving executives. While correct, this argument is only one-sided. It does not consider 
the incentives options can generate. Suppose the firm awards its CEO $1 million worth of 
incentive package in the form of restricted stock. Suppose now the firm replaces the 
restricted stock by stock options worth $1 million (to the firm). The incentives generated 
from the former cannot be the same as those from the latter. Quite simply, stock options 
make the slope of CEO’s compensation function steeper (unless the exercise price is 
equal to zero, in which case stock options are the same as stock). To argue whether stock 
options are an ‘expensive’ way to motivate executives, one needs to strike a balance by 
accounting for both their costs and their benefits. Simulations studies by Lambert and 
Larcker (2004) show that, for reasonable parameter values, the net benefits of stock 
options generally outweigh those of restricted stock for those executives who can ‘make a 
difference’. After all, stock options should not be used for those who cannot. 
Incentives for accounting manipulation are closely related to the other criticisms, 
along with broader issues of corporate governance, as mentioned above. So we will not 
discuss this separately.8 Many executives were rewarded handsomely during the boom 
market, making the gap between their pay and an average worker’s pay drift apart wider 
and wider.9  To the extent that this reward was a simple windfall as much of the anecdotal 
evidence during the dot.com boom suggests, the criticism is justified. At least in the US, 
this is due to near non-existence of performance hurdles or relative performance 
evaluation in executive stock options.10  As long as performance hurdles are absent, 
restricted stock is also subject to the same criticism, only to a different degree. What 
needs to be done, therefore, is to modify option compensation to filter out industry-wide 
effects and reward more for firm-specific performance. 
As for the fifth criticism, one needs to be careful in weighing the benefits of 
resetting against its costs. The main benefits of resetting are reincentivization and 
retaining valuable employees who might otherwise ‘reset themselves by leaving the firm’ 
when their options are deeply under water. However, resetting could harm initial 
incentives when it is anticipated (Acharya et al., 2000). Ultimately, therefore, it is an 
empirical question whether option resetting is indeed a bad thing. Empirical evidence as 
to the benefits and costs of resetting is not conclusive: resetting is more likely in firms 
with greater agency problems, and tends to occur following poor firm-specific 
performance without significant follow-up gains (Brenner et al., 2000; Chance et al., 
2000); resetting is more likely in young, high-tech firms operating in competitive labour 
markets (Carter and Lynch, 2001); firms that restrict resetting are more vulnerable to 
                                                 
8 Using the US data on 50 firms accused of accounting fraud by the SEC during 1996-2003, Erickson et al. 
(2004) report a positive correlation between the likelihood of accounting fraud and the proportion of stock-
based compensation. 
9  In 1999, an average pay of CEO in large US companies was about 475 times that of an average 
manufacturing worker, an increase by almost a factor of 10 compared to three decades earlier (Towers 
Perrin; Standard and Poor’s). 
10 In Australia, various performance hurdles and relative evaluation have been in place for some time, with 
relative total shareholders return being the predominant metric used. See Kerin (2003). 
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voluntary executive turnover (Chen 2004); costs of resetting are modest while restricting 
resetting pushes firms to inferior contractual choices at deadweight losses to shareholders 
(Chidambaran and Prabhala, 2004). Finally, there is some evidence that CEOs might 
opportunistically choose the timing of resetting (Callaghan et al., 2004). 
 Regarding the final criticism, it is not so much an issue of whether options 
intrinsically encourage excessive risk-taking, but whether the contracts are designed 
optimally. An option-based contract does not necessarily lead to excessive risk taking if 
the terms of the contract such as the size of the grant, maturity and exercise price, are 
chosen optimally (Carpenter, 2000; Choe, 2001, 2003).11 For example, if more risk taking 
is desirable for the firm as a whole (e.g., for firms in growth industries), the exercise price 
can be adjusted upwards, thereby setting a higher goal. It is possible that these terms are 
not chosen optimally in corporations with ‘captive’ boards, in which CEOs use stock 
options as a camouflaging device for rent seeking (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2004). It is in this sense that executive stock options cannot be considered in 
isolation from broader governance issues. 
 
 
3. Option-Based Contracts Dominate Stock-Based Contracts 
 
3.1. General Model and Weak Dominance 
 
Our basic model is embedded in a simple, but general, moral hazard environment. The 
firm consists of two players whom we call the owner (shareholders as a whole or the 
board that diligently represents shareholders’ interests) and the manager (CEO or a 
management team).12  The owner initially holds 100% of the firm. The manager privately 
chooses the level of effort Ee∈  that affects the firm’s share price denoted by +ℜ∈p . 
Conditional on the manager’s level of effort e, the cumulative distribution of p  is 
denoted by )|( epF with corresponding density function ).|( epf  The owner’s 
preference is represented by an increasing, concave von-Neumann Morgenstern utility 
function v defined on her monetary payoff. The manager’s preference is represented by 
),( eyu where u is increasing and concave in ,y  his monetary payoff, and decreasing and 
concave in .e  His reservation utility is denoted by .U  Both players maximize their 
expected utility. 
 Suppose first that the owner uses a stock-based contract to motivate the manager. 
Denote the stock-based contract by ℜ×∈ ]1,0[),( ss bα  where sα  is a fraction of the firm 
and sb is a base salary. Note that we did not impose any restriction on .sb  When we later 
impose limited liability on the contract, we will assume .0≥sb  Given ),,( ss bα  if the 
manager chooses ,se then his expected utility is 
 
                                                 
11 Ross (2004) provides a general analysis of conditions under which incentive schemes make an agent 
more or less risk averse. In particular he shows that the common folklore that a convex payoff structure of 
options makes an agent to take more risks is false. 
12 We will use the female gender pronoun for the owner and the male gender pronoun for the manager. 
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            ∫ +≡ )|(),(),,( ssssssss epdFepbuebU αα ,                (1) 
 
and the owner’s expected utility is  
 
            .)|()])1[(),,( ∫ −−≡ sssssss epdFbpvebV αα                        (2) 
 
 The owner’s optimal contracting problem can be written as 
 
 ),,(Maximize ),,( sssseb ebVsss αα       subject to 
 (IC): )',,(maxarg )'( ebUe ssses α∈  and (PC): UebU ssss ≥),,(α           (3) 
 
where (IC) is the incentive compatibility constraint and (PC) is the participation 
constraint. Let ECs ×ℜ×⊂ ]1,0[ denote the set of ),,( sss ebα  satisfying (IC) and (PC). 
Thus sC  specifies the set of feasible stock-based contracts. We assume that sC  is non-
empty and problem (3) has a solution. 
 We now turn to option-based contracts. Denote the option-based contract by 
ℜ×ℜ×∈ +]1,0[),,( oo bkα  where oα is a fraction of the firm that the manager can buy at 
an exercise price k and ob is a base salary. For obvious reasons, we assume that the 
exercise price cannot be negative. Given ),,,( oo bkα if the manager chooses ,oe  then his 
expected utility is 
 
 ∫ +−+≡ )|(],)([),,,( 0 ooooooo epdFekpbuebkU αα ,               (4) 
 
and the owner’s expected utility is  
 
 ∫ −−−≡ + )|(])([),,,( ooooooo epdFbkppvebkV αα .             (5) 
 
 In the above, }0,max{)( kpkp −≡− + . The owner’s optimal contracting problem 
is then 
 
 ),,,(Maximize ),,,( ooooebk ebkVooo αα  subject to 
 (IC): )',,,(maxarg )'( ebkUe oooeo α∈  and (PC): .),,,( UebkU oooo ≥α          (6) 
 
 Let us denote the set of Eebk ooo ×ℜ×ℜ×∈ +]1,0[),,,(α  satisfying (IC) and (PC) 
of (6) by oC , which specifies the set of feasible option-based contracts. Again we assume 
that there is a solution to problem (6). Note that, if ,0=k then the restriction of oC  to 
E×ℜ×]1,0[  coincides with sC . Denote this set by .| 0=koC Then we have  
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),,0,(),,( ebVebV os αα =  for all 0|),,( =∈ koCebα .  Comparing (3) and (6), it is easy to see 
that option-based contract weakly dominate stock-based contracts. 
 Suppose ),,,( * ∗∗∗ ooo ebkα  solves (6) and )~,~,~( sss ebα  solves (3). Suppose first 
.0* =k  Then, by the argument above, ),,( ∗∗∗ ooo ebα  should also solve problem (3), hence 
).~,~,~(),,0,( ssssoooo ebVebV αα =∗∗∗   If  ,0* >k  then, by the definition of ),,,( * ∗∗∗ ooo ebkα  
being a solution to (6), we have ),,0,(),,,( * ebVebkV ooooo αα ≥∗∗∗ for all .|),,( 0=∈ koCebα  
Since ,|)~,~,~( 0=∈ kosss Cebα  we have ≥∗∗∗ ),,,( * oooo ebkV α  )~,~,0,~( ssso ebV α  = ).~,~,~( ssss ebV α  
Thus the owner’s expected utility from an optimal option-based contract is at least as 
large as that from an optimal stock-based contract. This leads to 
 
PROPOSITION 1: An optimal option-based contract weakly dominates an optimal stock-
based contract. 
 
 The logic of Proposition 1 is quite simple. With option-based contracts, the 
contract designer has one more contractual variable, namely exercise price, at disposal. 
As long as this additional contractual variable is suitably chosen, the designer cannot do 
any worse than stock-based contracts. Precisely because of this simple logic, the above 
weak dominance result applies to most general situations. For example, we did not 
impose any restrictions on utility functions, nor made any assumptions on the distribution 
function.13  The flip side of the coin is that, if the manager rather than the owner were 
designing the contract, he would again be no worse off with option-based contracts than 
with stock-based contracts.14 
 However, the weak dominance result of Proposition 1 is not an entirely robust 
defense for option-based contracts. If an optimal option-based contract is more likely to 
have zero exercise price under reasonable utility and distributional assumptions, we are 
on a shaky ground arguing that option-based contracts are better than stock-based 
contracts, although the latter are a special case of the former with zero exercise price. 
Unfortunately, we cannot say much more than the weak dominance result for general 
utility functions. The reason for this is the incentive-risk tradeoff. 
 Suppose the owner replaces shares of stock by options with positive exercise price, 
of which costs to the owner remain the same. For any positive exercise price, the owner 
can grant more options, thereby making the slope of the manager’s compensation 
function steeper15 and increasing the pay-performance sensitivity (Jensen and Murphy, 
1990).  This would induce more effort from the manager. On the other hand, such a 
convex transformation of compensation function leads the manager to bear more income 
                                                 
13 The result does not depend on any assumptions on F such as the monotone likelihood ratio condition or 
the convexity of distribution function condition. The only assumptions we need are those that guarantee the 
existence of solutions to problems (3) and (6), such as the continuity of the objective functions and those 
that ensure that the constraint sets are compact. 
14 Coupled with managerial power theory of Bebchuk et al. (2002), this could be taken as one reason for the 
proliferation of executive stock options during the 1990s. That is, if the CEO controls the board, and 
compensation committee in particular, then he should prefer option-based contracts to stock-based 
contracts as the former allow him to extract more rent from the shareholders. 
 
15 That is, the slope becomes steeper for stock price above the exercise price. 
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risks in general, which needs to be compensated for by a commensurate increase in the 
base salary. However, if the distribution of stock price satisfies standard conditions such 
as the monotone likelihood ratio condition, then, as the manager increases his effort level, 
the likelihood of his options being out of the money becomes increasingly small 
compared to that of his options being in the money. Therefore, we could expect option-
based contracts to do better than stock-based contracts unless the manager is very risk 
averse or the effect of his effort on the firm’s stock price is very small. 
 As mentioned in the previous section, Hall and Murphy (2000, 2002) do not 
consider the incentive effect of options. That is, the distribution of stock price is assumed 
exogenously given in their studies. They calculate the cost of at-the-money options to the 
firm (the Black-Scholes value) and their value to an undiversified, risk-averse executive 
(the executive value) when the executive cannot trade options. For the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion ranging from 2 to 3, their calculation shows that the executive value 
is considerably smaller than the Black-Scholes value. Based on this, they suggest that 
options are an inefficient way of compensation compared to restricted stock. Lambert and 
Larcker (2004) question the validity of this conclusion since Hall and Murphy do not 
solve the optimal contracting problem, but rather look at the cost minimization problem 
assuming that incentives remain the same. Lambert and Larcker conduct simulation 
studies based on the owner’s optimal contacting problem, assuming that stock price 
follows a truncated normal distribution and the manager’s effort affects the mean of 
distribution. Their results are in stark contrast with Hall and Murphy’s. When the 
manager is less risk averse (the coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 0.5), options 
are shown to be part of the optimal contract. For high risk aversion (the coefficient equal 
to 2), options are still shown to be optimal when volatility is small.16  Whether options 
are an efficient form of compensation for the risk-averse manager is thus an empirical 
question after all. To say something more than weak dominance, we would need more 
information on various model parameters. 
 In case the manager is risk neutral, one side of the tradeoff disappears. Thus 
option-based contracts can be shown to strictly dominate stock-based contracts. As this 
case is helpful in understanding the mechanics of incentive provision through option-
based contracts, we discuss this next. 
 
3.2. Risk-Neutral Case and Strict Dominance 
 
We assume that both players are risk neutral and the manager’s utility function is 
separable, which is denoted by )(ecy −  where y  is his monetary payoff and )(ec  is 
disutility of effort satisfying 0)('',0)(' >> ecec  for all .Ee∈  We also assume that 
)|( epF satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio condition (MLRC) and the convexity of 
                                                 
16 Hall and Murphy justify the size of risk aversion they use based on empirical estimates in the literature. 
Lambert and Larcker argue that, while no empirical evidence is available, executives in entrepreneurial 
firms may be considerably less risk averse than the “average” investor, whose risk aversion is the basis of 
Hall and Murphy’s studies. 
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distribution function condition (CDFC), which allow us to use the ‘first-order approach’ 
(Grossman and Hart, 1983; Rogerson, 1985).17 
 If the manager chooses ,e  then total surplus from the owner-manager relationship 
is .)()|()( UeceppdFeS −−≡ ∫  Let us denote the first-best level of effort by ,*e which 
maximizes ).(eS  The first-order condition is given by 
 
 *)('*)|( eceppdFe =∫                   (7) 
 
where eF  denotes the derivative of F  with respect to .e  Since )(eS  is strictly concave in 
e due to (CDFC) and ,0'' >c   *e  is a global maximizer of  ).(eS  It is well-known that the 
owner can easily induce the first-best level of effort if the manager is risk neutral and 
there are no restrictions on feasible contracts. We consider this case first. 
 Consider a stock-based contract ℜ×∈ ]1,0[),( ss bα , which implements Ees ∈ . We 
do not impose limited liability, hence ℜ∈sb . In this case, the owner can simply ‘sell’ the 
firm to the manager at a fixed price, which induces the manager to choose the first-best 
level of effort. The owner can then set the fixed price to extract the entire surplus. Thus 
the optimal stock-based contract is given by 1=sα  and )( *eSbs −= . It is straightforward 
to check that the manager’s (IC) implies ,*ees =  and (PC) is binding. Such an optimal 
contract can be trivially replicated by an option-based contract ),,( oo bkα with 
,1== so αα ,0=k  and ).( *eSbb so −==  Thus an optimal stock-based contract and an 
optimal option-based contract are equivalent if there is no limited liability on the base 
salary. 
 Obviously the case without limited liability is not all that appealing. So we restrict 
the base salary to be nonnegative. This implies that the above solution of ‘selling the 
firm’ is no longer feasible and, therefore, .1<sα  In this case, it is possible to show that, 
for any stock-based contract, there is an option-based contract that leaves the manager’s 
expected utility the same but strictly increases the owner’s expected utility. In other 
words, an optimal option-based contract strictly dominates an optimal stock-based 
contract. The intuition is again straightforward. With limited liability, the first-best level 
of effort is not chosen and, therefore, there is room for increasing total surplus if the 
manager can be motivated to increase his level of effort. Since the manager is risk neutral, 
the optimal contract need not compensate him for bearing additional risks. Therefore, for 
any given stock-based contract, there is an option-based contract with strictly positive 
exercise price that provides stronger incentives at no additional cost of risk-bearing. This 
is shown formally in several steps below. 
 Suppose an optimal stock-based contract is given by ℜ×∈ ]1,0[),( ss bα , which 
implements Ees ∈ .  Since 1<sα , the manager chooses the level of effort below the fist-
                                                 
17 (MLRC) states that )|(
)|(
epf
epfe  is increasing in p where fe is the derivative of f with respect to e. (CDFC) 
requires F(p|e) to be convex in e. 
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best level, *e .  That is, *ees < .  This can seen from (IC) for se . Thanks to (CDFC), 
corresponding (IC) can be replaced by its first-order condition. 
 
 ).(')|( sses ecepdF =∫α                (8) 
 
Comparing (7) and (8), it is immediate that *ees < for all 1<sα . 
 Consider now an option based contract ),,( oo bkα that implements oe . Again (IC) 
corresponding to oe can be replaced by the first-order condition. Moreover, total 
differential of the first-order condition leads to 0>∂∂ ooeα and 0<∂∂ keo . Define 
 
 )|()),(|()(),( ∫∫ −−≡Δ + ssoooo eppdFkepdFkpk αααα            (9) 
 
where ),( ke oo α is the effort level that satisfies (IC) given ),( koα . Thus ),( koαΔ  is the 
change in the expected value of the manager’s at-risk pay when the stock-based contract 
),( ss bα is replaced by the option-based contract ),,( oo bkα . Note that ),( koαΔ is 
continuous in ),( koα  and 0)0,( =Δ oα . Further, ),( koαΔ is decreasing in k  since 0<∂∂ keo  
and (MLRC) implies that )|( epF  first-order stochastically dominates )'|( epF for any 
pair 'ee > .  Similarly ),( koαΔ is increasing in oα . Therefore we can find ),( koα with 
so αα > , 0>k , and so ee > such that 0),( =Δ koα . That is, the incentive component of 
the stock-based contract, ,sα can be replaced by that of the option-based contract, ),( koα , 
leading to a higher level of effort while keeping the manager’s at-risk expected pay the 
same. 
 Next we adjust the base salary for the option-based contract to compensate the 
manager for the increased disutility from the higher level of effort. Specifically choose 
ob  such that the manager’s expected utilities are the same under both contracts: 
),,,(),,( oooossss ebkUebU αα = . Since 0),( =Δ koα , such ob is given by 
 
 )]()([ soso ececbb −+= .             (10) 
 
 So far we have shown that, for the optimal stock-based contract, there is an 
option-based contract with strictly positive exercise price, which implements a higher 
level of effort from the manager while not changing his expected utility. It remains to 
show that the owner is strictly better off under the chosen option-based contract. Using 
0),( =Δ koα and (10), we have ),,,( oooo ebkV α )()(),,( sossss eSeSebV −=− α where 
)(eS  is total surplus from e  as defined earlier. Since *eee os <<  and )(eS  is strictly 
concave with a global maximum at *ee = , it follows that )()( so eSeS > , or equivalently, 
),,,( oooo ebkV α ),,( ssss ebV α> . Summarizing, we have 
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PROPOSITION 2: If the manager is risk neutral and there is limited liability constraint 
on the base salary, then an optimal option-based contract strictly dominates an optimal 
stock-based contract. 
 
 A corollary to the above proposition is that the strict dominance relation will 
continue to hold when the manager’s risk aversion is small. This is due to continuity of 
the optimal contract with respect to the manager’s risk attitude. 
 
 
4. Example with Mean-Variance Preferences 
 
The previous section established general dominance results. In this section, we study an 
example. Given enough structure to preferences and stock price distribution, it is possible 
to solve for an optimal contract with restricted stock. However it is not possible to solve 
analytically for an optimal contract based on stock options. Therefore we resort to 
numerical simulations. The purpose of our example is to show that, when the manager is 
risk averse, we can find an option-based contract that strictly dominates the optimal 
contract with restricted stock, for a wide range of parameter values. 
 Denote the manager’s final income by y  and effort by e . Assume that the 
manager’s preferences can be represented by a mean-variance utility function: 
2
21 5.0)()(),( ceyVarmyEmeyU −−= where 0,, 21 >cmm . Stock price, denoted by p , 
follows a uniform distribution on ],[ sese +π  where s > 0. Thus the manager’s effort 
changes the support of the price distribution. In particular, it affects only the mean, but 
not the variance, which somewhat simplifies algebra. Moreover, stock-based contracts do 
not affect the variance of the manager’s income in this case, although option-based 
contracts do.  Thus, this example of uniform distribution amplifies the income risk from 
option-based contracts relative to stock-based contracts. Nonetheless it will be shown that 
option-based contracts dominate stock-based contracts through providing more work 
incentives. Given e, the stock price has 2)( π+= sepE  and 122)( π=pVar . In what follows, 
we ignore the base salary and the participation constraint. 
 Suppose first that the manager’s incentives are provided through stock. Let α  be 
the fraction of the firm awarded to the manager. Givenα , the manager’s utility is 
 
 2
2
2
21 2
1
122
),( cemsemeU −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ += παπαα .           (11) 
 
The manager’s incentive compatibility constraint requires that the manager choose e to 
maximize ),( eU α , which leads to .1
c
sme α=  Then the owner’s expected payoff is 
 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−=−=
c
smpEV απααα
2
1
2
)1()()1()( .           (12) 
 
Then the owner’s optimization problem leads to 
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 2
142
1
sm
cπα −=               (13) 
 
and the manager’s equilibrium level of effort is given by 
 
 
sc
sme
42
1 π−= .               (14) 
 
 From (13) and (14), it is easy to see how the optimal stock-based contract changes 
as the parameter values change. First, an increase in the manager’s cost of effort (c) 
increases the cost of providing incentives, thereby reducing the optimal size of stock 
grant, which in turn reduces the manager’s equilibrium level of effort. Second, as the 
manager’s input becomes more valuable, i.e., an increase in s, the optimal size of stock 
grant also increases, which in turn increases the manager’s equilibrium level of effort. 
Finally, the degree of the manager’s risk aversion (m2) does not change the optimal 
contract, nor the manager’s equilibrium level of effort. This is because, in our example, 
the manager’s effort affects only the mean of stock price distribution, but not the variance. 
 We now turn to the case the manager is awarded stock options. Let ),( kσ  be an 
option-based contract where σ  is the size of the option grant and k is the exercise price.  
If k is less than se, then the option-based contract is equivalent to the stock-based contract 
with ασ = and k = 0.  So we focus on the case k > se for all e. Then the manager’s utility 
is 
 
 221 2
1))(())((),,( cekpVarmkpEmekU −−−−= ++ σσσ          (15) 
where 
 σμπ
πσ
πσσ
π ≡−+=−=− ∫ ++ 2 )()())((
2ksedpkpkpE
se
k
         (16) 
and 
 
 ∫ + ++ −−=− sese dpkpkpVar π πμσσ 22 ))(())((  
    ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−+= ∫∫ + sekkse dpkpdp π πμπμσ 222 )(          (17) 
    ( )⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ +−+−= 22
32
2 2
1
2
3
)2(36)2(
2
)( μπμπμπμπ
μ
π
μσ sek . 
 
As before, the manager’s incentive compatibility constraint leads to the manager’s 
optimal choice of e that maximizes ),,( ekU σ .  Denote this by ),( ke σ . Then the owner’s 
optimal contracting problem is to choose ),( kσ to maximize her expected payoff 
 
 ∫ ++ −−+=−−= ),( )(2),())((),(
kse
k
dpkpksekppEkV
σπ
πσ
πσσσ .        (18) 
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 Since the above optimization problem cannot be solved analytically, in what 
follows, we conduct numerical simulations by assigning the following parameter values 
as our basic case: 11 === scm , 1.02 =m , and 8.1=π .18 Then from (13) and (14), the 
optimal stock-based contract is given by 05.0=α , and the manager’s equilibrium level of 
effort is e = 0.05.  The owner’s expected payoff in this case, denoted by sV , is 0.9025, and 
the manager’s expected utility, denoted by sU , is 0.0462.  Our purpose is to find an 
option-based contract, not necessarily optimal, that strictly dominates the optimal stock-
based contract.  For this, we start increasing σ  from 0.05, the optimal value of α , while 
increasing k as well.  For each pair of ),( kσ , we calculate the manager’s optimal choice 
of e, and then the corresponding payoff for the owner.  For our basic case, an option-
based contract that strictly dominates the optimal stock-based contract is given by 
12.0=σ  and k = 1.  This leads to e = 0.0568, the owner’s expected payoff oV = 0.9323, 
and the manager’s expected utility oU = 0.0227.  This option-based contract strictly 
dominates the optimal stock-based contract by a suitable adjustment in the base salary 
since so VV > and ssoo VUVU +>+ . 
 Next we examine whether the dominance relation is robust to changes in 
parameter values. First, we analyze the effect of the manager’s risk aversion by changing 
2m from 02 =m (risk-neutral case) to 152 =m , while holding other parameter values fixed 
as in our basic case. As noted before, the optimal stock-based contract is independent of 
2m and the manager’s equilibrium level of effort remains constant at e = 0.05.  However, 
given the option-based contract ),( kσ = (0.12, 1), an increase in 2m  decreases the 
manager’s effort level: the manager’s optimal effort level decreases monotonically from 
0.0571 to 0.0539 as 2m  increases from 0 to 15.  This reflects the fact that the manager’s 
income risk becomes relevant and significant with option-based contracts. Nonetheless, 
the manager exerts more effort than with the optimal stock-based contract.  As a result, 
the owner’s expected payoff is larger than with the stock-based contract: oV changes from 
0.9327 to 0.9296, larger than 9025.0=sV . However, as 2m  increases, the manager’s 
utility decreases unless there is compensation for the increased income risk. Thus 
ssoo VUVU +>+  for lower values of 2m  but the inequality is reversed for a large value 
of 2m . In our example, the cross-over occurs when 2m  = 11, the case where the manager 
is extremely risk averse.19 This is shown in the upper panel of Figure 1. Consequently, the 
option-based contract dominates the optimal stock-based contract unless the manager is 
extremely risk averse. 
 
                                                 
18 The details of the following calculations are available upon request. 
19 Since the stock price is assumed to be uniformly distributed, we cannot directly relate 2m to the known 
measure of risk aversion such as the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion. However, if the 
manager’s income were normally distributed, then the mean-variance utility with 11 =m implies that the 
degree of absolute risk aversion is equal to 22m . Thus 112 =m corresponds to the coefficient of absolute 
risk aversion of 22. 
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— Figure 1 goes about here. — 
 
 Second, we increase c from 0.98 to 1.02, while holding other parameter values 
fixed as in our basic case. As the manager’s cost of effort increases, the cost of providing 
incentives increases as well. This reduces the optimal size of stock grant (α ) from 0.059 
to 0.041, and decreases the manager’s equilibrium level of effort from 0.0602 to 0.0402. 
In this case, an option-based contract that dominates the optimal stock-based contract is 
given by ),( kσ = (0.12, 0.8). Given the option-based contract, the manager exerts less 
effort as c increases: the manager’s optimal effort level decreases monotonically from 
0.0726 to 0.0695 as c increases from 0.98 to 1.02.  However, the manager again exerts 
more effort than with each optimal stock-based contract corresponding to each value of c. 
As a result, the owner’s expected payoff is larger, and the sum of the owner’s and the 
manager’s utilities is larger with the option-based contract ),( kσ = (0.12, 0.8) than with 
the optimal stock-based contracts: so VV >  and ssoo VUVU +>+ . This is shown in the 
lower panel of Figure 1. Consequently, the option-based contract dominates the optimal 
stock-based contract for all values of ∈c [0.98, 1.02]. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Recent corporate scandals around the globe have led many to point the blaming finger at 
executive stock options. Whatever the reasons are, there even seems to be a trend of more 
and more firms moving away from using stock options as a main incentive component of 
executive compensation. The leading candidate for the replacement of stock options is 
restricted stock, or ZEPOs (zero exercise price options). This paper argued that such a 
move away from stock options may not be entirely justifiable. 
Using a simple, but general principal-agent model with moral-hazard, this paper 
has compared option-based contracts with stock-based contracts. In a general 
environment without restrictions on preferences or technologies, we have shown that 
option-based contracts can do at least as well as stock-based contracts. The weak 
dominance simply stems from the fact that options provide contract designers more 
flexibility than stock.20 The weak dominance relation becomes strict if the manager is risk 
neutral. If one interprets options as those with strictly positive exercise price and if the 
manager is risk averse, however, the usual risk-incentive tradeoff makes a direct 
comparison of options with stock difficult. Options provide more incentives but also 
more income risks compared to stock. Which effect will be more prominent is ultimately 
an empirical question that requires more information on the manager’s risk aversion and 
how the manager’s input affects the firm’s performance. Our simulation studies show that 
the strict dominance relation is likely to be robust. Recent simulation studies also suggest 
                                                 
20 While our argument was made in a moral hazard setting, the dominance result can be also shown in an 
adverse selection environment. The same flexibility of options contract enables the owner to design more 
efficient screening contracts than using stock alone. Oyer and Schaefer (2005) report evidence in support of 
this. 
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that, unless the manager is extremely risk averse, options with strictly positive exercise 
price are optimal. 
We have also argued that many of the criticisms against stock options are not 
about stock options per se. They relate to either poorly designed option-based contracts, 
or the environment - corporate, market and regulatory - in which stock options are used. 
Abandoning stock options altogether on this ground would deprive corporations of a 
valuable vehicle through which high-powered incentives can be provided. While it may 
be plausible to claim that high-powered incentives such as options exacerbate the 
problem when there are flaws in the environment, such a claim has yet to be tested both 
empirically and theoretically. What is certain, though, is that improved corporate 
governance, more transparent disclosure rules, and regulatory oversight that ensures well-
functioning capital markets would all make stock options a more, not less, valuable 
incentive mechanism than they are currently. It is an irony that efforts are made to redress 
the flaws in the environment on the one hand, while more corporations are abandoning 
stock options on the other. 
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Figure 1: Stock-Based Contract vs. Option-Based Contract 
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